Merger activities in innovative industries point to a relation between mergers and innovation. Firms' innovative ideas may spillover to other firms dis-incentivizing innovation activities, but merger may be a way to capture innovation spillover. The mergerinnovation nexus has been well studied in the theoretical literature and recently in the empirical papers, but empirical evidence on merger and innovation spillover is limited.
Introduction
High-tech and innovative industries host a great deal of merger activities (De Man and Dysters, 2005; Chirgui, 2009) , which may imply a likely relation between mergers and innovation.
Mergers might be appealing for innovative firms, as they are often a more efficient approach to increasing capacity than direct investments (Katz and Shelanski, 2005; Becketti, 1986) .
Mergers might also help innovative firms in combining R&D resources, gaining economies of scale and scope, handling large fixed costs, and strengthening their research pipelines (Huck et al., 2000 and Henderson, 2000) .
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Innovation spillover is another driver for merger of innovative firms (Katz and Shelanski, 2005) . Firms' innovative ideas may spillover to other firms, making innovation's private returns less than its social returns and, therefore, dis-incentivizing innovation activities (Aghion and Howitt, 1988 , 1992 , 1998 Jaffe, 1998) .
2 Innovation can spillover through knowledge creation on technical improvements, such as changes in product design or upgrading production systems (Norman and Peball, 2004) . This sort of created knowledge might spillover through movements of employees or common input suppliers and customers (Baptista, 2000) . To capture innovation spillovers, firms might choose to merge, which also influences competition in innovation and changes innovation potential (Entezarkheir and Moshiri, 2017; Shelanski, 2005, 2007) .
Despite the theoretical background, the empirical evidence on merger and innovation spillover is limited. In this paper, we contribute to the literature by providing empirical evidence on the impact of innovation spillovers on firms' merger likelihood using a large data set on U.S. firms.
Spillovers can be outward or inward. In outward spillover, firms may act as a source of innovation and give away the knowledge generated from their innovative activities to rivals. In inward spillover, firms are the receiver of innovation spillover and enjoy benefits of externally generated knowledge from other firms' innovative activities. As Driffield (2001) , Driffield et al. (2010), and Oulton (1997) argue, the innovative activities of firms are indicators of technological development and the generated knowledge. The knowledge and innovation have critical roles in competitive advantages of firms (Alcacer and Chung, 2007) .
Nevertheless, the non-proprietary nature of the knowledge makes it harder to protect the knowledge from the leakage, and innovation spillovers are highly likely to happen. Moreover, the knowledge spilling out of the firm may limit the spilling firms' ability in reaping the benefits of their innovation, discourage them from innovative activities, and facilitate the free-riding by rivals (Belleflamme and Peitz, 2010 p.497) . To internalize these outward spillovers, fix the free-riding problem, and dampen the competition, the spilling firm may choose to merge. An act of merger might be particularly encouraged, as innovation might also be better exploited through coordination, such as a merger (Tirole, 1988, p.414 ). This implies that firms' own innovation, as a proxy for outward spillover, increases the likelihood of spilling firms' merger.
Spillover receiving firms are also interested in maximizing benefits of their inward innovation spillovers, as the knowledge generated out of technologically related research activities of other firms may help receiving firms to achieve results with less research effort and increase the productivity of their innovation activities (Jaffe, 1986; Alcacer and Zhao, 2012) . Nevertheless, innovations of spilling firms reduce their costs and increase their efficiency. Thus, spilling firms become more competitive relative to a receiving firm, their output increases, and they limit the market for the receiving firm. To regain the lost market share in response to the impact of other firms' innovation on competition, receiving firms might choose to merge with a potential target to control the negative impact of other's innovation on their competitive edge (Alcacer and Chung, 2007) . This implies that inward innovation spillover increases the likelihood of receiving firms' merger.
Our study also contributes to the open question on driving factors of mergers in the literature (Brealey et al., 2012) . Previous studies offer neoclassical, behavioural, and Q-theories of mergers to explain merger waves. The neoclassical theory focuses on industry shocks, such as anti-trust policies and deregulations, as main forces behind the merger waves (Gort,1969; Harford, 2005; Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996; Andrade and Stafford, 2004; Komlenovic et al., 2011) . The behavioural theory's reasoning for mergers is a temporary stock misvaluation of firms (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004) . The Q-theory of mergers offers that firms with high Tobin's Q can profitably expand through mergers (Hasbrouck, 1985; Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002) . Business cycles are also known as another driving factors of merger activities (e.g., Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001; Komlenovic et al., 2011) . When firms expect higher demand, they will increase their production capacity through mergers. Nevertheless, as stated in Brealey et al. (2012) , these theories have not been able to fully explain merger waves. Our study adds to this line of research by analysing the impacts of innovation spillovers in merger decisions at the firm level.
Our further contribution is constructing and using a panel of more than 6,000 publicly traded merging and non-merging U.S. firms in the manufacturing sector from 1980 to 2003 with 800 merging pairs of firms for our empirical analysis. A unique aspect of this data set is that it has information not only on merged entities in the merging year and post-merger period, but also on both target and acquiring firms in the pre-merger period.
Our findings based on a panel logit estimator suggest that the firms with innovative activities are on average more likely to merge and that innovation spillover is an important driver of merger decisions. There is a possibility of reverse causality in the impact of outward spillovers, measured by firms' own innovation, on mergers. Mergers lead to larger firms and less competitive markets that influence innovative activities of firms. Mergers may encourage innovation incentives due to economies of scale and scope, improved ability in handling risks of innovation investments, and a broader knowledge base (Schumpeter, 1942, Gilbert and Newbery, 1982) . Mergers might also discourage innovation by eliminating competition, increasing costs, and decreasing production efficiencies (Arrow, 1962 and Reinganum, 1983 , 1984 . Using the first and second lags of a measure of patent ownership fragmentation in the technology market as instruments, we find that the instrumented impact of innovation on the probability of mergers is also positive. These results imply that innovative firms may choose to merge to internalize their spillovers and gain their competitive edge. Our findings also show that within industry inward R&D spillovers increase the likelihood of mergers but between industry inward R&D spillovers do not influence the merger decisions significantly. These findings are robust to alternative measures of spillovers and different estimation methods.
Our study provides valuable insights for policy makers. The positive impact of inward and outward R&D spillovers on mergers provide evidence for the role of innovation in shaping up the market structure of the manufacturing sector. Although competition can decrease prices and increase consumer welfare, a more stringent regulation on mergers only to protect competition may miss innovation opportunities created by merging firms. In other words, the stringent merger regulations may reduce the ability of firms to capture their knowledge spillovers and to reap all the benefits of innovations or even gain their competitive edge relative to other innovative firms. As a result, innovative firms might be discouraged, leading to fewer new products and a slow-down in quality improvement that can adversely affect consumer welfare. Therefore, when decisions are made on merger applications, the losses of less competition and higher prices on consumer welfare generated by mergers should be weighed against the benefits arising from more innovation. This comparison of losses and benefits should also consider whether the merger is happening within an industry or between industries, as the impact of innovation on mergers is not the same between these two cases.
Empirical Framework
Our empirical analysis is based on the following panel logit regression equation,
where the merger likelihood of firm i at time t (P rob(M erger it )) is explained by the logarithm of its own stock of R&D (logR&DStock it−1 ) as a measure of innovation and a source of outward innovation spillover, the logarithm of R&D spillovers that firm i will receive from other firms' innovative activities or inward R&D spillovers (logSpillR&D it−1 ), and a series of controlling variables listed in vector X. The variable M erger it is an indicator variable which is equal to 1 when a merger takes place and zero otherwise. This is similar to Gugler and Siebert (2007) and Entezarkheir and Moshiri (2017) , who use this measure of merger to estimate the impact of mergers on market share and the impact of innovation on mergers, respectively. The vector X d includes a set of control variables, which are explained in section 2.3 and it is an idiosyncratic error term with zero mean and constant variance. α i represents possible unobserved heterogeneities among firms that might arise from different firm characteristics and performances. 
Measuring Outward and Inward Spillovers
We measure innovation as a source of outward spillover with the variable logR&DStock it−1 in equation (1). Following Hall et al. (2005) , this variable is built based on a declining balance formula with the depreciation rate of 15% as R&Dstock t = (1−δ)R&Dstock t−1 +R&D t . The variables R&Dstock t and R&D t stand for R&D stock and R&D flow at time t, respectively. 3 We do not control for target firms' fixed effects separately as we assume targets are selected randomly by acquiring firms and they do not play a role in the decision making process of mergers. 4 We define the initial stock of R&D variables as the initial sample values of the R&D variable similar to Noel and Schankerman (2013) and select the depreciation rate (δ) equal to 15%, similar to Hall et al. (2000 Hall et al. ( , 2005 Hall et al. ( , and 2007 ). Hall and Mairesse (1995) show experiments with different deprecation rates, and they conclude that changing the rate from 15% does not make a difference in the measure of stock variable.
Following Entezarkheir and Moshiri (2017) , we use lagged R&D stock to capture the time lag between the innovation and merger decision.
Employing the methodologies developed in Bernstein and Nadiri (1989), Jaffe (1986) , Bloom et al. (2013) , Noel and Schankerman (2013) , and Entezarkheir (2017), we measure inward R&D spillover (SpillR&D it ) of firm i in equation (1) with a weighted sum of other firms' stock of R&D as follows:
where ρ ij measures the technological proximity between firms i and j, and R&Dstock jt stands for the R&D stock of firm j at time t.
A proper measure of R&D spillover among firms must identify which firms may receive spillovers from a particular research activity. As Jaffe (1986) argues, firms mostly benefit from R&D of the other firms that are closer to them in their technological field. Therefore, we use parameter ρ ij in equation (2) as a proxy for the technological proximity between firms i and j. ρ ij is built based on the uncentered correlation coefficient of the location vectors of firms i and j (S i and S j ). For example, the location vector of each firm i (S i ) based on the distribution of the share of the firm i's patents across N different technology classes is Jaffe's (1986) measure for the parameter ρ ij , which is
and utilizes the distribution of patents across the USPTO technology classes. The range of ρ ij is between 0 and 1. The index approaches to 1 as firms get closer to each other in their technological field, and to zero when the location vectors of firms are orthogonal.
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Technological proximity between firms changes only very slowly, as specialization in various areas of research is not easily acquired and changes are costly (Jaffe, 1986) . Thus, we assume that the parameter ρ ij does not change over time. Noel and Schankerman (2013) and Entezarkheir (2017) suggest using the distribution of the citations in the patents of each firm across N different technology classes of USPTO for location vectors rather than using count of patents. This means s ik in a location vector is the share of all citations in the patents of firm i that belong to a technology class k. The patent citations reflect the benefits that a firm receives from the research activity of other firms in the same technology field.
We also utilize the distribution of citations across different technology classes of the USPTO to build the location vectors. In our sample of analysis from 1980 to 2003, which is explained in section 3, we have 411 different technology classes. We use the proximity measure in equation (3) to calculate the R&D spillovers that firm i receives at time t from other firms based on equation (2). We employ the logarithm of lagged SpillR&D it in equation
(1). As Griliches (1992) suggests, it is unlikely that R&D spillovers are contemporaneous because of secrecy, publication delays, or the time that they take to materialize in new products and diffuse in the economy.
Intra and Inter Industry Spillovers
Innovations at the firm level can spillover within industry (intra spillover) and between industries (inter spillover). Intra spillover is more applicable to the industry specific innovations, while inter spillover would likely apply to more general innovations. Moshiri and Simpson (2011) find intra spillovers have stronger effects on firms' productivity than inter spillovers.
When firms within an industry are engaged in more R&D activities, they likely increase their 5 The proximity measure is symmetric to the ordering of firms (ρ ij = ρ ji ).
market shares due to the higher efficiencies and lower costs resulted from their innovation.
Mergers can be seen by smaller firms within the industry as a way out of more competitive pressure generated by innovation. The homogeneity of products, technology, market information, and marketing strategies of firms within an industry would also make mergers less costly and more effective.
To examine the effects of different types of spillovers, we divide the inward R&D spillover (SpillR&D it ) in equation (2) into within industry spillover (intraSpillR&D izt ) and between industry spillover (interSpillR&D izt ) and include logintraSpillR&D izt−1 and loginterSpillR&D izt−1 instead of logSpillR&D it−1 in equation (1).
To define the boundaries of industries in building the intra and inter R&D spillovers, we use the six industry classifications of Hall et al. (2005) and Hall and Vopel (1997) , which are: Chemicals, Computers, Drugs, Electricals, M echanicals, and OtherIndustries. The variable intraSpillR&D izt for firm i from industry z, is the weighted sum of the R&D stock of all firms in industry z at time t, except for firm i, and is measured as
where z = 1, ..., 6 and n z is the number of firms in industry z, excluding firm i. The parameter ρ ij is constructed based on equation (3) and the USPTO technology classes for each pair of firms.
Similarly, the variable interSpillR&D izt for firm i from industry z is the weighted sum 6 Chemicals includes chemical products, Computers consists of the computers and computing equipment, and Drugs includes optical and medical instruments, and pharmaceuticals. Electricals contains electrical machinery and electrical instrument and communication equipment, and M echanicals includes primary metal products, fabricated metal products, machinery and engines, transportation equipment, motor vehicles, and auto parts. The number of firms and the number of mergers in each industry in the sample are: Chemicals: 174, 21 (12%); Computers: 337, 28 (5.3%); Drugs: 1089, 87 (8%); Electricals: 1250, 99 (8%); and M echanicals: 866, 91 (10%).
of R&D stock of firms in all industries other than industry z. We measure this variable as
where h can be any industry except for the industry in which firm i belongs to, and n h is the number of firms in other industries.
Control Variables
The literature suggests a number of factors affecting merger decisions, which are included in the variable X d in equation (1). Those factors are categorized based on their different approaches and known as neoclassical, behavioural, and Q theories of mergers. The neoclassical theory lists industry shocks and changes in anti-trust policies as the main determinants of firms' merger decisions (Gort, 1969) . Andrade and Stafford (2004), Boone and Mulherin (2000) , and Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) show a positive relation between number of mergers in an industry and industry shocks and merger activities are generally concentrated in a few industries at a time. A similar finding is present in the studies of Komlenovic et al. (2011) and Harford (2005) .
Following Harford (2005), we include asset turnover (Asset T urnover it ), employee growth (EmployGrowth it ), sales growth (SaleGrowth it ), profitability (P rof itability it ), measured by net income divided by sales, ROA (ROA it ), and capital expenditures (CapitalExp it ) in equation (1) to control for the impact of industry shocks. 7 Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) show that changes in anti-trust regulations also have positive effect on mergers, but since the regulation changes happened in industries that are not in our sample of analysis, they 7 Harford (2005) and Komlenovic et al. (2011) use the first principal component of AssetT urnover it , EmployGrowth it , SaleGrowthit, P rof itability it , ROA it , and CapitalExp it to measure industry shocks. They justify using the first principal component of these variables by high level of multicollinearity among these variables in the industry level. However, we do not find this problem at the firm level data, and, therefore, we use the six variables above directly in equation (1). As a robustness check and for the sake of comparison, we will also report our estimates of equation (1) with the first principal component of these variables in section 4.
are not applicable to our estimations.
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What drives the merger decisions in the the behavioural theory of merger is a temporary stock misvaluation by merging firms. According to this theory, the undervalued firms are acquired by overvalued firms, and this misvaluation drives merger decisions (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002) . To test for the theory, one can investigate whether the ratio of market value to book value is higher when merger activities are increased.
In stock-based merger transactions, Ang and Cheng (2006), Dong et al. (2006) , and Rhodes- Kropf et al. (2005) find that the acquirer is more over-valued and the target is more undervalued than cash-based merger transactions. Loughran and Vijh (1997) show that acquiring companies that use stock in their merger transactions have negative long-run abnormal returns, whereas, the long-run abnormal returns of acquirers is positive in cash merger transactions. Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) also find that acquirers overestimate the value of target companies in overvalued markets and underestimate it in undervalued markets. The Q-theory of mergers also considers firms' large Tobin's q as the driver for merger decision. Hasbrouck (1985) and Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) show that firms with large Tobin's q are more likely to acquire companies with low Tobin's q.
To control for the impacts of behavioural and Q theories of merger, we include a measure of Tobin's q (T obin sq it ) in equation (1). Following Hall et al. (2005) , we construct the variable by the ratio of market value (M arketV alue it ) to book value (T A it ), where the market value of a firm is calculated as the sum of the current market value of common and preferred stocks, long-term debt adjusted for inflation, and short-term debts of the firm net of assets. The book value of a firm is calculated as the sum of net plant and equipment, inventories, investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries, and intangibles and others. All of the components of T A it are adjusted for inflation. Finally, we include a measure of business cycles to control for the impact of the state 8 According to Harford (2005) , the regulation changes happened in 1981, 1982, 1984, 1987, 1989, and 1991-1996 . We also estimated equation (1) controlling for these regulation changes but our estimated coefficients of logR&DStock it−1 and logSpillR&D it−1 present a similar result.
9 Inflation adjustments are based on the CPI urban U.S. index for 1992 (Source: http://www.bls.gov).
of the economy on merger decisions. The mergers are claimed to be procyclical, as a boost in current economic activities predicts an increase in the future demand, which requires an increase in the capacity of production (Becketti, 1986; Jensen, 1993; and Shleifer and Vishny, 1992) . The capacity can be expanded through either internal investments or mergers. The choice of merger is often more attractive, as it increases capacity at a much faster pace (Becketti, 1986) . However, the empirical literature, which is mostly based on aggregate and industry level data, is not conclusive on procyclicality of mergers (Weston, 1961; Nelson, 1966; Gort 1969; Melichner et al., 1983; Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001; Komlenovic et al.,2011) . Our study examines the procyclicality of mergers but at the firm level. The advantage of a merger study at the firm level is that the pre-merger information of targets and acquirers does not disappear in the aggregation process of mergers into industry level.
We consider BC t−1 in lagged format as business cycles require some time to have an effect on merger decisions.
Similar to Komlenovic et al. (2011) , we employ the Chicago Fed National Activity Index (CFNAI) as a measure of business cycles. This index is built from a weighted average of 85 indicators for current economic activities. 10 Positive CFNAI corresponds to growth above trend, and negative CFNAI indicates growth below trend, zero CFNAI means growth at trend.
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Following Andrade and Stafford (2004), we further control for the concentration in the industry of acquiring firms in equation (1). This helps us to isolate the effect on merger likelihood that depends on the overall structure of competition in the industry of the acquiring firm (Jaffe, 1986) . The variable HHI ht is the concentration in the industry (h) of firm i in year t, which is calculated by the summation of squared market shares of firms in that industry. The market share of firm i in year t (M arketShare it ) is measured by the ratio of the firm i's sales in year t to total sales of primary four-digit standard industry classification (SIC4 or h) that firm i belongs to in year t. 12 In the case of a merger, M arketShare it in the pre-merger period and in the merging year is measured by the combined market share of acquirer and target, and in the post-merger period by the market share of the merged entity.
Following Entezarkheir and Moshiri (2018) , the target and acquiring firms with the same four-digit SIC codes in the pre-merger period and the merging year are assumed to be in the same market and their average market shares are obtained. In the case of different SIC codes, firms are assumed to be in different markets with their own demands and, therefore, their combined market shares are considered. For non-merging firms, M arketShare it is the market share of non-merging firm i in year t. in the manufacturing sector; however, our choice is restricted by availability of the data.
In the next step, we combine the patent and citation information with the Compustat 14 The publicly traded firms are those traded on the New York, American, and regional stock exchanges, as well as over-the-counter in NASDAQ.
15 The company identifier file is available at http://elsa.berkeley.edu/∼bhhall. 16 According to the USPTO's website, withdrawn patents are those that are not issued (http://www.uspto.gov/patents/process/search/withdrawn.jsp).
Note that the citation data are not limited to public firms. we eliminate these mergers from our analysis. As a result, there remain 877 pairs of mergers with 6,741 observations.
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The combined Compustat, patent, and SDC merger data set has observations for both merging and non-merging firms. In cases of mergers, the acquiring firms are observed in the pre-merger periods and the merging year, merged entities are observed in the postmerger period, and target companies are only observed at merging year. To incorporate the pre-merger information of target firms, we employ our hand-matched SDC target names to the Compustat firms and locate each target's pre-merger information among Compustat firms. Then, we hand-match this information to the combined Compustat and patent files for targets in the pre-merger period. This means that, we observe both target and acquiring companies in the pre-merger period and the merging year. In the post-merger period, we observe merged entities. In the next step, we added the information on business cycles from Bloomberg to the combined Compustat, patent, and SDC merger data set. The resulting baseline sample and data set, used in our estimations, is an unbalanced panel of 6,030 publicly traded merging and non-merging manufacturing firms with 60,736 observations from 1980 to 2003. Of course, the exact number of observations depends on the regression model employed. Table 2 in the appendix A presents the descriptive statistics of all variables, and Table 3 is the correlation matrix of key variables in equation ( 
Results
We estimate equation (1) of section 2 to investigate the impact of inward and outward spillovers on the likelihood of mergers. The results are reported in Table 4 in the appendix A.
To avoid inconsistent estimates due to unobserved firm heterogeneities, we estimate Columns
(1) to (3) of Table 4 using a fixed effect panel logit estimator. The standard errors are all bootstrapped standard errors. Column (1) includes all the theories of merges and the rest of the controls suggested in the literature and explained in section 2.3. Column (2) controls for business cycles and neoclassical theory of mergers. The third column shows the base estimation results, when we only control for business cycles.
The impacts of logR&DStock it−1 and logSpillR&D it−1 as measures of outward and inward R&D spillovers on merger likelihood are positive and statistically significant in all specifications presented in Columns (1) to (3). The positive and statistically significant impact of firms' own R&D stock implies that when firms' innovative activities spillover to their rivals without a proper compensation, they opt for merger to internalize spillovers, dampen competition, and fix the free-riding of rivals on their innovation. The positive impact of logSpillR&D it−1 indicate that when a firm's rivals are engaged in more innovative activi-ties, the likelihood of merger increases to mitigate the risk of loosing competitive edge in the market. Following Cameron and Trivedi (2010) , the calculation of marginal effects of a fixed effect logit estimator for panel data requires estimating firm unobserved heterogeneities which is not feasible. Thus, we interpret the magnitude of results in Table 4 in the appendix A based on odds ratios. For instance, the estimated coefficient of logR&DStock it−1 in Column (1) of Table 4 implies that the increase in a firm's own R&D stock increases the odds ratio of merger for this firm by 15%. The estimated odds ratio of logSpillR&D it−1 is 19%, which means the odds ratio of merger for firms, whose research is in the areas where other firms do more research is 19% after controlling for their own R&D to curb any technological competition. Additionally, each firm's average predicted probability of merger conditional on positive outcomes (having a merger experience) is 9.5%.
The impact of business cycles (BC t−1 ) on manufacturing firms' merger decision is positive and statistically significant across all models in Columns (1) to (3).
18 This finding conforms to the idea of procyclicality of mergers suggested by Becketti (1986), Shleifer and Vishny (1992) , Jensen (1993), Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) , and Entezarkheir and Moshiri (2017) .
The expectation of higher demand during booms encourages mergers, as they increase the production capacity to meet the higher demand faster.
Among the six control variables representing industry shocks suggested by the neoclassical theory, only asset turnovers (AssetT urnover it ) and employee growth (EmployGrowth it ) have statistically significant coefficients. Most of the literature suggests an overall positive impact of the industry shock on merger activities, but our result based on the two variables above is mixed and conforms to the findings of Entezarkheir and Moshiri (2017) b.
Following the explanations in section 2.3, we also estimate the model of Column (1) of Table 4 in the appendix A using the suggested first principal component of the six control variables of the neoclassical theory of mergers similar to Industry-level study of Harford (2005) The estimated coefficient of T obin sq it , as a measure of stock over-valuation effect, is negative but not statistically significant. The negative impact of Tobin's q on the probability of merger conforms to the hypothesis of the excess capacity in Danzon et al. (2007) . They argue that firms that expect a higher growth will experience a larger Tobin's q and less incentive to merge, but firms with limited prospects will have less future cash flows and, consequently, smaller Tobin's q. Thus, the merger likelihood could be negatively correlated with acquiring firms' Tobin's q. However, we lay limited emphasis on the negative impact of Tobin's q in our findings, as it is not statistically significant. 
Reverse Causality
There is a possibility of reverse causality in the impact of outward spillover on merger decisions in equation (1). When firm i increases its R&D expenditures, its probability of being the first to innovate increases, which means that the probability of other firms to be the first to innovate decreases. In other words, part of the gain from increased R&D for firm i is a loss for a rival firm in terms of its success in innovation. If firm i and its rival merge, they would end up choosing lower level of R&D than before. Thus, mergers can result in an undesirable reduction in R&D expenditures (Cabral, 2000, p.307) . Another channel of reverse causality stems from the fact that mergers result in larger and less competitive firms, which may encourage innovations and R&D investments due to economies of scale and scope, improved ability in handling risks of large R&D investments, and a broader knowledge base (Schumpeter, 1942; Gilbert and Newbery, 1982) . Mergers might also discourage innovation and R&D investments by eliminating competition, increasing costs, and decreasing production efficiencies (Arrow, 1962 and Reinganum, 1983 , 1984 . innovators (Entezarkheir, 2017) .
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Innovators build their innovation upon a "patent thicket" (Shapiro, 2001) , which is a set of complementary patents and requires them to obtain permission from all of the right holders in their thicket to commercialize their innovation. When the patent ownership becomes highly fragmented, patent thickets become denser in a sense that innovators have to deal with a larger number of patent holders in their thicket. In highly fragmented markets with dense patent thickets, innovators are to pay for transaction costs of identifying a large number of right holders in their thicket, which translates into a very large set of licensing fees to be paid to these right holders. The highly fragmented market even increases the likelihood of unintentional missing of some of the right holders in the thicket and later facing a risk of hold-up and litigation costs. The large licensing fees, transaction costs, risk of hold-up and litigation costs in fragmented markets raise the enforcement costs of patents, which can discourage firms' R&D investments, as they might predict that the fruit of their R&D cannot be properly protected by patents. As a result, we postulate that the measure of fragmentation in patent ownership as our instrument may have a negative correlation with 20 For a list of studies on market structure and innovation see Entezarkheir and Moshiri (2018) . 21 The CAFC unified standards across circuits and granted stronger patent rights (Gallini, 2002) . The USPTO also started to grant patents extensively following the decision of Congress in the late 1990s that changed the USPTO from an agency funded by tax revenues to an agency funded by fees that the USPTO collects (Jaffe and Lerner, 2007, p. 11) . 22 The timing of these pro-patent shifts overlaps with our sample of analysis from 1980 to 2003.
logR&DStock it−1 . Nevertheless, we do not see any reason for a correlation between patent ownership fragmentation and merger decisions of firms.
To measure our instrument, we employ the fragmentation index used by Ziedonis (2004) and Entezarkheir (2017) . This measure is based on a normalized Herfindahl index and calculated using the formula
where i = j. The variable cite ijt is the number of citations made by firm i in its patent documents to the patents of firm j at time t. The variable cite it is the count of all the citations made by firm i in year t to other firms' patents. Each citation made in a patent document is a reference to a complementary patent.
The index F it is zero when all the citations are made to the patents of one firm, and this measure is one when every citation is to the patents of a different firm. The instruments that we use are logF it−1 and logF it−2 . We use these lagged formats as our endogenous variable (logR&DStock it−1 ) is in lagged format. Table 5 in appendix A reports the first and second-stage IV regression results. Columns
(1) and (2) employ logF it−1 and logF it−2 as instrument, respectively. Column (3) uses both instruments. The coefficient estimates of all instruments in Columns (1) to (3) of Table 5 are negative and statistically significant at 1% level of significance. This finding conforms to the idea that enforcement costs of patents resulted from high fragmentation of patent ownership in the technology market discourage R&D activities of firms. Furthermore, the first-stage F-statistics is large across all columns, rejecting the null hypothesis that the estimated coefficients of the instruments are equal to zero. This reduces concerns that second-stage estimates might be unreliable. The overidentifying restrictions test results for the specification in Column (3) indicates that the hypothesis of exogenous instruments could not be rejected. 23 These results imply that the instruments in Column (3) of Table 5 can explain variations in merging decisions, while uncorrelated with error terms. The results obtained from the second-stage IV estimations are consistent with those reported earlier.
Specifically, the instrumented impacts of logR&DStock it−1 on merger likelihood presented in Table 5 are all positive and statistically significant similar to estimates in Table 4 .
Robustness checks
We perform a number of robustness checks to address potential caveats in our results. First, although the Hausman specification test supports the fixed effect panel logit estimator, using the fixed effect panel logit estimator decreases the number of observations considerably. The fixed effect panel logit estimator eliminates firms with no within group variation in terms of their mergers. In other words, non-merging firms are removed from the regression sample. As a robustness check and to avoid selection bias, we also estimate the model in Column (1) of Table 4 in appendix A with a random effect panel logit estimator with bootstrapped standard errors and report the result in Column (4) of Table 4 . The effects of logR&DStock it−1 and logSpillR&D it−1 on merger decision are still positive and statistically significant.
Second, we examine whether our findings are sensitive to proximity measures that are defined by industries rather than technology classes. Thus, in the construction of inward R&D spillovers of equation (2), we define the parameter ρ ij of equation (3) based on the six industry classifications of Hall et al. (2005) and Hall and Vopel (1997) , explained in section 2.2, rather than technology classes of the USPTO. As a result, each component s iz of the location vector of each firm, S i , in equation (3) shows the share of all citations in the patents of firm i that belong to industry z, where z=1,...,6. Variable SpillR&DInd it shows the alternative measure of spillover, whose lag is used in the regression. The results of the re-estimated model are shown in Column (5) of Table 4 in appendix A. The positive impacts of outward and inward R&D spillovers on merger likelihood are robust to this measure of inward R&D spillovers.
Third, it can be argued that the variable R&D stock may not be a proper measure of innovation, because it is an input for innovative activities. To address the concern, we also use the citation-weighted patent stock variable (CitationP atent it ) of Hall et al. (2005) and Entezarkheir and Moshiri (2018) instead of R&D stock. The variable CitationP atent it as a proxy for outward spillover assumes that the value of each patent is equal to the number of its citations received. Thus, this measure takes into account not only the output of the innovative activity but also the quality of the innovation via its citations. CitationP atent it is built based on the similar declining balance formula used in building R&DStock it above.
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As a result of a gap between the application and grant date of patents, the data on patents and their citations are truncated. Patents with an application date close to the end of the sample might be granted out of the reach of the sample. Similarly, patents in the sample might receive further citations outside the sample period. We correct for these truncations in building the variable CitationP atent it . See appendix B for detailed correction procedures.
As in equation (2), the inward spillover variable SpillCiteP at it is also constructed using the citation-weighted patent stock.
The estimation results of innovation measured by citation-weighted patents are reported in Column (6) of Table 4 in appendix A. The coefficients of both inward and outward spillover variables remain positive and statistically significant, with smaller magnitude for the outward spillover and larger magnitude for the inward spillover.
Fourth, in our specification, we have kept the acquirer but removed the target in the data for the post-merger period. This means that the post-merger R&D for the acquirer increases automatically because it includes the R&D of the acquirer and the target. Since the acquirer with a high R&D level does not merge again in the period right after the previous merger, this set up might generate biased results on the lagged R&D coefficient. To address this issue, we remove both acquirer and the target in the post-merger period and apply the Tobit model for censored data to the model of Column (1) in Table 4 of appendix A and re-estimate the coefficients. Our estimated coefficients for outward spillover and inward spillovers are 0.022 (Std.Error=0.002) and 0.028 (Std.Error=0.004), respectively. They remain positive and statistically significant, although with smaller values. Fifth, as Table 2 in appendix A shows, some variables have large standard deviations relative to their means, implying that the results might be driven by the outliers. To address the robustness of our findings to outliers, we remove the observations in the first and 99th percentiles and re-estimate the model of Column (1) in Table 4 in appendix A. The impacts of logR&DStock it−1 (0.268, Std.Error=0.131) and logSpillR&D it−1 (0.874, Std.Error=0.247) on merger stay positive and statistically significant.
Sixth, time-varying differences of innovating and non-innovating firms in terms of their characteristics and outcomes might be the factors that are actually driving their merger decision to be acquiring or non-acquiring firms. Therefore, we need to account for differences in firms characteristics by applying a matching method to ensure that merger decisions are the result of being innovative. To compare R&D-doing with non-R&D-doing firms with similar characteristics, we employ the propensity-score matching (PSM) method (Bandick et al., 2014; Szucs, 2014) . In an ideal case, we would like to compare the merger likelihood of R&D-doing firms with their merger decision when they were not participate in R&D, but such information is not available. However, using the PSM method, we can build the missing counterfactual, and compare the merger decision of R&D-doing firms with the merger decision of non-R&D-doing firms with similar characteristics as our control group.
We first estimate the propensity score using a probit model including variables that affect our outcome (Austin et al., 2007) . The dependent variable is our treatment variable (an indicator variable for whether firms participate in R&D or not) and the explanatory variables include R&D spillovers and factors representing neoclassical, behavioural, and Q theory of merger theories. We also use one lag of the explanatory variables, as each variable takes time to show impact on the decision to do R&D. As in Bandick et al. (2014) , we also include controls for time and industry to ensure that the matched control observations are assigned only from the same year and industry as each merging firm. Then, we conduct the matching using the nearest-neighbour method and calculate the average treatment effect on treated (ATT). In the matching process, the average absolute bias before matching is 29.9%
and after matching is 3.7%. 25 We also check for the balancing condition, according to which each explanatory variable does not differ significantly between R&D-doing and non-R&D-doing firms. We further examine the common support condition, under which the firms with the same characteristics have a positive probability of being in both the treatment and non-treatment groups. 26 The ATT result using PSM is 0.019 (Std.Error=0.009), indicating that both the balancing and common support conditions are satisfied. This result translates into a significant positive impact of innovation on merger, conforming to our original findings reported in Table 4 of appendix A.
Seventh, the other concern that might arise here is that the positive impacts of R&D and R&D spillover on merger likelihood are simply due to higher product market competition. Following Noel and Schankerman (2013) , we estimate Column (1) in Table 4 of appendix A with and without a control for product market competition. As explained in section 2.3, we measure product market competition with a Herfindahl index that utilizes firm level sales in four-digit SIC codes (logHHI ht ). Column (1) of Table 4 reports the estimates with the variable logHHI ht . We also estimate the same model as column (1) without the variable logHHI ht . In this model the estimated coefficients on logR&DStock it−1 and logSpillR&D it−1 are 0.370 (standard error=0.127) and 0.699 (standard error=0.221), respectively. Since the estimated coefficients in models with and without a control for product market competition are very similar, we might be able to conclude that the positive effects of logR&DStock it−1 and logSpillR&D it−1 do not reflect the product market competition.
There is a caveat here that the HHI index based on sales at the 4-digit SIC codes might not 25 The bias is defined as the difference of the mean values of the treatment group and the control group, divided by the square root of the average sample variance in the treatment group and the not matched control group (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985) . Our results are robust to other matching techniques, such as Kernel matching.
26 To check for the common support condition, we compare the min and max values of the propensity score in both target and control groups. For details on this method, see Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) .
be a good estimator of the product market competition. Nevertheless, based on the available data, logHHI ht is the possible measure.
R&D Spillovers by Industry
As discussed earlier, innovation can spillover within or between industries and their impacts on mergers might be different. In this section, we use within industry R&D spillover (intraSpillR&D izt ) and between industry R&D spillover (inerSpillR&D izt ) measures of section 2.2 in equation (1) to isolate their individual effects on merger decisions.
The results are reported in Column (1) of Table 6 in appendix A. Both intraSpillR&D izt and inerSpillR&D izt have a positive impact on merger likelihood but only the intra industry spillover effect is statistically significant. The result is similar to the findings of other studies, such as Moshiri and Simpson (2011) , who show that intra spillovers have much stronger effect on productivity than inter spillovers. This implies that innovative activities of a firm within an industry limits the other firms' markets, encouraging them to merge as a way out of losing their competitive edge.
As a robustness check for the intraindustry and interindustry spillovers, in Column (2) of Table 6 , we limit our sample of merging and non-merging firms used in Column (1) of Table 6 to only horizontal mergers and non-merging firms. We also estimate the model for a sample containing only non-horizontal mergers and non-merging firms and report the results in Column (3). Considering the explained six industries of Hall et al. (2005) and Vopel (1997) in section 2.2, we assume a merger is horizontal if the industry of target and acquiring firms are the same. Non-horizontal mergers are identified for cases where the industries of merging parties are not the same. Based on the results of Columns (2) and (3), within industry spillovers increases the likelihood of the horizontal mergers but between industry spillovers do not influence merger decisions among firms from different industries.
Conclusion
Due to the public good nature of the knowledge, firms' innovative ideas may spillover to others. As a result, innovative firms may engage in merger activities to capture their innovation spillovers. Firms that fall behind by the innovation generated by rivals may also decide to merge to avoid losing the competition edge. Despite the theoretical explanations in the literature on the impact of innovation on mergers, the empirical evidence on merger and innovation spillover is limited.
In this study, we use a novel unbalanced panel data set on more than 6,000 publicly traded merging and non-merging U.S. firms in the manufacturing sector from 1980 to 2003 to investigate the impact of innovation spillovers on merger likelihood. Contrary to previous studies, our data set includes information on target companies in the pre-merger period for each of the merging pairs of firms as well as non-merging firms in the data. We consider both outward and inward spillovers, where the former concerns innovation spillover from a firm to rivals, and the latter applies to a firm as a receiver of spillover from the innovation generated by other firms. We measure firm's innovation by R&D investments and citation-weighted patent stocks and, the spillovers by the weighted sum of R&D and citation-weighted patent stocks of other firms, where weight factors are a measure of technological proximity.
Our results show that both outward and inward spillovers are important drivers of merger activities. The positive impact of outward spillover implies that when a firm's innovation spills over to other firms, it creates an incentive for the firm to internalize the spillovers, dampen competition, and avoid the free-riding of rivals through mergers. The positive impact of inward spillovers also indicates that rivals' innovative activities encourage a given firm to merge to avoid the risk of losing its competitive edge in the market. The positive impacts of spillover variables persist after addressing the possible endogeneity in the impact of outward spillover using a measure of fragmentation in patent ownership as our instrument. Finally, our findings show that within industry inward R&D spillovers increase the likelihood of mergers but between industry inward R&D spillovers do not influence the merger decisions significantly. Our robustness check exercises show that the main findings on the positive effects of spillovers on mergers are robust to different measures of innovation spillovers, other control variables, as well as alternative estimation methods.
This study provides evidence for the positive role of innovation and its spillovers in manufacturing merger activities and market structure for anti-trust policies. Our findings suggest that the anti-trust policies should weigh the welfare loses associated with decreasing competition against the benefits of promoting innovation through mergers. Concentration in the industry of each firm calculated Compustat and authors' from the summation of squared market shares. calculation Market share is the ratio of each firm's sales (MM$) to total sales of primary four-digit SIC4 that the firm belongs to.
T obin sq it
The ratio of market value (MM$) to book value (MM$) Compustat and authors' calculations Notes: The signs ***, **, and * mean significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The numbers in the parentheses are bootstrapped standard errors. Notes: The signs ***, **, and * mean significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The numbers in the parentheses are the clustered standard errors in the first stage and bootstrapped standard errors in the second stage. Notes: The signs ***, **, and * mean significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The numbers in the parentheses are bootstrapped standard errors.
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B Correcting Truncation in Patent and Citation Counts
To address the plausible truncation in patent counts, we adopt the approach of Hall et al. (2000) , which defines weight factors to correct for truncation in patent counts. The weight factors for our study are calculated according to P atentCount * t = P atentCount t
2003−t J=0
W eight J 2000 ≤ t ≤ 2003, (B.1)
where P atentCount t is the number of patents granted at time t to all firms and W eight J is built based on the average of citations in each lag for the patents of firms. Lags are defined as the difference between the ending years of the sample and the last year of the sample, year 2003 . Therefore, lags are 2003 -2000=3, 2003 -2001=2, 2003 -2002=1, and 2003 -2003=0. Hall et al. (2000 multiply the count of patents in ending years of the sample (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) with the inverse of the weight factors (1/P atentCount * t ) and correct for the truncation. We only correct patent counts for 2000 to 2003 because following the argument of Hall et al. (2000) , from 2004 to 2006, when the patent and citation files in this research end, the results are under the influence of "edge effect". Hall et al. (2000) explain that the "edge effect"makes the very last years of patenting and citation data unusable, and they have very large variances. Figure A. 1 displays a comparison of original patent counts to the corrected patent counts for truncation.
To address the truncation in citation counts, we also follow the method of Hall et al. (2000) . We calculate the distribution of the citations received by each citing patent between the grant year of the citing patent and the grant year of the cited patent in the patent document of the citing patent. Then, using this distribution, we forecast the number of citations that might be received for each citing patent outside the range of the sample up to 40 years after the grant date of the citing patent. Figure A. 2 illustrates a comparison of original citation counts to corrected citation counts. The truncation corrected patent and citation counts are used in this paper. 
